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Upon Information and Belief
Eureka!

The lost has been found!

In our April issue we asked for certain missing numbers of DICTA
in order that the editors might have a complete set. So enthusiastic was
the response that within four hours after that issue was delivered, we
had more offers than we could accept. Norma L. Comstock gave us one
number and Hudson Moore gave us the balance. Coming in as close
seconds were S. L. Anrud and B. 0. Wheeler. To each we express our
warmest appreciation, and all shall be enshrined in our Hall of Fame.
Here is something else you can do which not only we but also your
brothers in the profession will appreciate. Write us an article. Surely
all of us have something from time to time which we might contribute.
It need not be long-sometimes the best articles are short. If what you
have is interesting or amusing to you, it will be equally so to many others. So let us have it. If you wish, we will see that it is put into proper
form for publication. In fact, we try to do that even without any
encouragement. Remember that the coach with only eleven candidates
has a hard time making a football team. The same applies to a magazine.
It is your magazine, not ours, and it can be only as good as you make it.

Calendar
M ay 4 ----------------------------------------------------M eeting of Denver B ar A ssociation
A pril 6 ....................................................- M eeting of D enver B ar A ssociation
M ay 9 .---------------.--------------------------------.............--------------Law Day at Boulder
May 23 ---------------------------...--------------------------------------Institute at M onte Vista
August 17-------- Meeting of the Committee on Uniform State Laws at Detroit
August 24
- --. Meeting of the American Bar Association at Detroit
September 18-19 ---------- ....------------------Meeting of the Colorado Bar Association
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Denver Bar to Elect Officers
The aominating committee of the Denver Bar Association has made
the following nominations for officers and trustees to serve the Association for the fiscal year 1942-1943:
President
-----------------------------PERCY S. MORRIS
Vice-President
-------------------FLOYD L. WALPOLE

Second Vice-President
T rustee
T H OM A S K E ELY --------------------------------------------------T rustee
H ORACE N . H AW KINS, JR ----------------------------------------FRANK A. WACHOB ---------------------------

The by-laws of the association provide that further nominations
may be made by filing with the secretary, at least fifteen days before the
annual meeting, the name or names of additional candidates. Since the
meeting is to be held on May 4, 1942, and since, as the secretary informs
us, no additional nominations have been made, those nominated by the
committee will become the officers of the association for the next ensuing year.

Law Day in Boulder on May 9th
Law Day in Boulder this year will be on May 9. The first session will be held at 9:45 A. M. in the Law Building on the university
campus, and the subject for discussion will be "The New Rules in
Action." It will be a panel discussion of the operation of the rules in
the light of one year of experience. The panel will consist of Judge
Claude C. Coffin of Ft. Collins, Arthur H. Laws and Edward L. Wood,
both of Denver. The last hour will be confined to a general discussion
by the panel and the audience of problems that have arisen in the
application and non-application of the rules.
At 12:30 P. M. a law luncheon will be held in the Gold Room of
the Memorial Building under the auspices of the Student Bar Association. Richard H. Shaw, perhaps better identified to Denver lawyers as
the son of George H. Shaw, will act as toastmaster. The speaker will
be President Robert L. Stearns.
The afternoon from 2:00 until 6:00 will be taken up with
campus recreational activities including the spring football game.
At 6:00 P. M. the Law Dinner will be held in conjunction with
the Boulder County Bar Association in the High School cafeteria. Frank
F. Dolan will preside as toastmaster, and the speaker will be Professor
Fred G. Folsom, affectionately known to a host of lawyers in the Rocky
Mountain region, his former students, as "P. I."
Lawyers and their ladies are invited to all functions. The luncheon
is 75 cents and the dinner $1.00. Reservations for the luncheon and
dinner meetings should be sent to Dean Edward C. King at the Law
Building.

The Appellate Brief
BY WILEY RUTLEDGE*

My job as a judge is to read briefs and to write opinions. Yours as
lawyers, in part, is to write briefs and read opinions. We therefore
approach briefs, and perhaps also opinions, from different viewpoints
and with different attitudes,. You are committed to advance to one side.
We, presumably, are impartial and disinterested. Your job is to make
your brief, and through it your case on appeal, more convincing than
the other fellow's. Ours is to stand between you. And by that I do not
mean merely "to try the record and the briefs." It is, rather, regardless
of the respective merits of the briefs, to find the truth and right of the
case so far as not only they, but the record and the law, permit. For
after all, it is not the lawyers, but the clients, whose interests we try.
And for that reason we must be on guard lest a too excellent presentation
blind our eyes to the merit of a cause poorly or less ably presented on the
other side. We read the brief, therefore, and particularly at first, not
with suspicion, but rather always with a question. These differences in
approach have important consequences for the preparation of the brief,
as well as for its consideration. Some will be noted as we proceed.
ORAL ARGUMINT

There is a clear difference between the function of the oral argument and that of the briefs. Lawyers, and clients, place much emphasis.
and properly, on the former. The function of the oral prtsentation is
controlled by two factors. One is its brevity: The other is the preparation with which the judge comes to it. That is determined, of course, by
whether he has read the briefs, or them and the record, before the argument. If he has not done so, and unless the case is very simple, the argument can perform generally two functions.
One is to give the judge a bird's-eye view of the important facts.
In this there is frequent failure. Often the argument becomes so clouded
in a hodgepodge of basic facts and intricate factual detail, much of it
irrelevant, that the judge who has not previously dug out the essential
ones, can't see the forest for the trees, the bushes, and the trailing arbutus.
For him, this kind of argument is a total loss.
The other function, closely related to the first, is to bring out clearly
the controlling issues in the case. This, in my judgment, is more than
half the battle. But often it, too, is lost at the argument because the
lawyer brings so many points to the court's attention. The result is he
*Associate Justice, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
and formerly of the Boulder bar. This address was delivered before the Bar Association
of the District of Columbia and is reprinted by permission.
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gets it for none. And occasionally the argument serves rather to confuse
than to clarify the issues, not merely because of their number, but because
the lawyer has not thought his case through to the real questions involved. If he had done so, there would not be so many. If the attorney
succeeds in getting to the court a clear picture of the essential facts and in
drawing out the real issues, his argument is a success. That is true
whether he wins or loses. Occasionally he will be able to add to this
something beyond casual reference to the authorities. In simple cases he
can do even more, and give full discussion of those cases which are in
point or very closely approximate. But in the main, not much can be
done, especially by appellant's attorney, toward thorough discussion of
previous decisions. In that situation, therefore, the time which remains
after stating the facts and elucidating the issues is better devoted to discussion of them on controlling principles, with reliance on the brief for
detailed substantiation.
An entirely different type of argument could be had, even in the
short time allowed, if all the judges should come to the hearing thoroughly prepared on the facts and the law by previous reading of the
record and briefs, and study of the issues and authorities. Then the
statement of the facts could be omitted or highly skeletonized. The
greater portion of time, on both sides, could be given to analysis of
issues, discussion on principle, and argument from authority. In some
instances the court might itself indicate which of the issues it regarded
as controlling or doubtful, and thus secure emphasis where most needed.
Such an argument would be something more than the "bird's-eye" type,
as to both facts and law. It would place appellant and appellee at more
equal advantage. Some might object that it would cause the court to
come to the argument with prejudgment or predisposition, but in any
event there would be opportunity for correction. And it is doubtful
whether this effect would be more pronounced than under the "bird'seye" type.
But presumably the latter is the more prevalent, and therefore the
one for which, in general, preparation must be made. And this has some
consequences for the brief.
RECORD

The proper purpose of an appeal is to secure a decision "whether
or not one or the other of the parties has been ill used under the law.",
This should be modified to say "so ill used under the law that the judgment should be reversed." For not every error is prejudicial or sufficiently
so to require reversal. The purpose of the record on appeal is to tell the
'Stone, The Scope of Review and Record on Appeal, at page 4, found in JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPHS, Series A, No. 16, prepared under the
Auspices of The Special Committee on Improving the Administration of Justice of The
American Bar Association.
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appellate court what happened at the trial and other previous stages of
the litigation. It is to present "an authenticated story of the action and
trial between Joe Doe and Richard Roe from their coming into court
until their appeal to the higher court.' '2 But, except rarely, it need not
tell everything. It should tell enough, and seldom more than enough, to
bring before the appellate tribunal a general view of the case as background or setting for the issues and a clear comprehension of the facts or
incidents with respect to which it is claimed prejudicial error was made.
With the practice, recently adopted here and previously in the Third and
Fourth Circuits, concerning printing of the record,, much of the formerly
existing difficulty in this respect has disappeared. The appendices, together with the statements of fact in the briefs, generally give an adequate
picture to the previous phases of the litigation. The bar has cooperated
splendidly in this. Some have gone farther by submitting cases upon
agreed statements of fact. These greatly relieve the burden of the court.
I trust the day has passed when, as was true with at least one case heard
before the new rule took effect, the judges had to wade through ten thick
volumes of printed record and index, most of which set out the rambling
kind of testimony which has become admissible in some administrative
proceedings. This is not intended to imply that I think the technical
rules for admission of evidence in court should apply to such cases. Quite
the contrary. Some of the rules for exclusion are still too rigid for use
even in court. And as to others, there are valid reasons for excluding
certain types of evidence from use by juries which have no sensible application when facts are determined by experts, many of whom are lawyers.
In other words, equity long anticipated the wider opening of the doors
of proof which has become characteristic of the administrative tribunal,
and the reasons are substantially identical in both cases. But when, on
appeal, the attorneys throw the whole mass of administrative evidence at
the reviewing court, without regard to the relative importance of different parts in relation to issues having real possibility of prejudice and with
no effort at condensation or elimination, the court, to speak mildly, has
some cause for complaint. It is part of the lawyer's job, if he wants real
and favorable consideration for this case, and his client's, to have not
only consideration, but some mercy, for the court. When he designates
and prints such a mass of irrelevant material he is simply loading or
unloading on the court's shoulders a job he is too lazy, too busy, or too
lacking in perspective to do. Yes, we do read the record-and the briefs.
"Ibid.
'Rule 17 of the General Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia provides in part: "Unless ordered by this court, it shall not be
necessary to print the record on appeal or on petition for review of or enforcement of
an order, except that appellant shall print as a part of the appendix to his brief the
pertinent pleadings and pertinent docket entries, the judgment or order appealed from
or sought to be reviewed or enforced, together with any findings of fact. conclusions of
law and opinion or charge of the court, board or commission."

1121

DICTA

But occasionally we do it muttering through our teeth things we could
not say aloud in Sunday School. This, however, is the rarer case. If it
still exists, it is more perhaps in relation to appeals from administrative
determinations than in regard to judicial proceedings, with the possible
exception of some patent cases. I.n the latter there appears to be still a
tendency, not only to set out the testimony in full, but to clutter the record with references and exhibits without any effort at elimination of
irrelevant parts, particularly of applications. So much by way of what
I hope may be called a "parting shot" at a practice which is disappearing.
This criticism must be guarded. It is better to overload the record
than to leave out something vital. And at times that occurs. The lawyer,
if he must err in this respect, should do so on the side of his client, rather
than that of relieving the court. But this is a different thing from throwing in everything on the chance the court itself may fish out something
the lawyer may miss. It is this shotgun practice toward which the criticism is aimed.
BRIEF
And now for the brief. What is it supposed to do, how should it
do it, and what should it not do? There are both "do's" and "don'ts."
The term "brief" arises, perhaps, from the English practice in
which it refers to the statement or summary given by the attorney or
solicitor to the barrister for the latter's use in the trial of the cause.
Hence, the barrister is "briefed." But obviously it has acquired a different
meaning and function in our practice. We are not discussing trial briefs.
Laying aside the formal requirements of the rules, the brief has several functions. Its basic one is to get to the court your picture of the
facts, analysis of the issues, and application of the law. If it does this,
you win. I should like to consider each of these phases separately to
some extent, and at the outset with reference to the "do's."
The Facts
First, then, your picture of the facts. The case is greatly simplified
for all when the facts, or the essential ones, are not disputed. The agreed
statement is appropriate for this situation. There are also many cases in
which factual difference is limited to a few things-the bulk of the evidence is not controversial. In such cases, an agreed statement, so far as it
can go, likewise is helpful. I suspect it would be as much so to the lawyers as to the courts, if in every case they should approach the appeal in
the spirit of the question, "How much can we agree upon?" rather than
"How much can we fight about?"
But when the facts are highly and generally in dispute, whether
because of conflicting evidence or because of conflicting inferences and interpretations, the factual function of the brief becomes important. It is
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so in any case where there is not either formally or substantially an agreed
statement. This, in several respects.
In the first place, the appellant's attorney (or appellee's, if necessary) can set forth a connected statement of the essential facts. Here the
brief can perform a "bird's-eye" function. And it is a valuable one,
especially when the record or appendix is long and complicated. Since
the more detailed facts appear of record, the brief-writer does not fear
that by failing to mention those he regards as immaterial or subordinate
he will prejudice his client's cause. So he can freely and truly summarize.
And this often, and especially when well done, may be 'the most helpful, if not also the most important part of the brief. It cuts the brush
away from the forest. It lifts the judge's vision over the foothills to
the mountains. It enables him to read the record with an eye to the
things which are important, in other words, intelligently, in true perspective.
Secondly, this phase of the brief gives opportunity for placing
emphasis-that is, where you think it should be. What are not the
facts in bird's-eye view, but the most important facts? What are the
Long's Peaks as distinguished from the Bear Mountains and the Flagstaff Mountains? Here perhaps I should ask what are the Great Smokies
or the Alleghenies and what the Blue Ridge?
Again, what are the true facts? The jury and the trial tribunal
have the major function here. But there are times when appellate
tribunals must exercise some judgment on this. Perhaps it is most
important in the matter of inferences and interpretation. How are
proven facts to be regarded? What other facts may be drawn, permissibly or rightly, from them?
Finally, and this is related to all the foregoing, what color shall
be given to the facts? There are times when color, which is more than
emphasis, more than the bare fact in proof itself, gives meaning concealed or dimmed without it. In what light is this or that fact to be
regarded? How is it affected by this or that other one or by the general
complex? The brief gives the legal painter his chance, but it is a
dangerous one if he attempts to apply color which is not on the palette
of the case. To change the figure, it can be a boomerang.
One thing more. The brief, as Justice Brandeis showed, is the
instrument for bringing to the court's attention and knowledge facts
not of record, but of which it may take judicial notice. You have no
idea how vastly ignorant judges may be of facts they know judicially.
There is a wide difference between judicial knowledge and actual knowledge. And in some, perhaps only a few, cases these are the crucial
facts. I hope this will not bring down in our laps a deluge of Brandeis
briefs. But there should be more of them, and they need not all be
long ones.
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Mechanically, I have only one suggestion in respect to the factual
portion of the brief, and that is for accurate reference to the appendix
(or record) for every statement of fact. It is worth that if it is worth
making. And it is a great time saver for us.
The Analysis of the Issues
I turn now to analysis of the issues. On this it is hard to generalize.
But I regard it as next in importance to stating the facts accurately,
sufficiently and succinctly. If the real issues are not drawn out, or this
is done only confusedly, the remainder of the brief becomes almost a
total loss, except for the possibility that some case or other authority
may be cited accidentally which gives light on them.
I do not know how to tell you how to analyze. Quite possibly
I cannot do it myself. Certainly I am no master of it. But I think I
can recognize true analysis when I see it and its absence when I don't.
In a large percentage of our briefs we have excellent analysis. But there
are still too many in which it is only half or two-thirds done. There
are a very few in which it amounts to less than that.
Two dangers may be selected for comment. . First, overanalysis.
When I find a brief which sets up from twelve to twenty or thirty issues
or "points" or "assignments of error," I begin to look for the two or
three, perhaps the one, controlling issue or issues. Somebody has got
lost in the underbrush and I've got to get him--or the other fellowout.
In one case the basic question was whether the court had jurisdiction of the cause in the fundamental sense. The issue was raised in
such form that if jurisdiction were lacking, all of the proceedings, including numerous orders entered over a period of several years in the suit
and in collateral proceedings in other jurisdictions would have been
"null and void." The determination of this issue controlled practically everything in the case. But one could not tell this from the brief
of the attacking party. When I first read it the impression was that
the trial court was not only filled, but saturated, with error. There
were apparently a score of major issues, as to each of which egregious
error had been made. They affected the service of process, the appearance
of the opposing attorneys and their authority to appear, the authority
of agents to act for principals, the validity of dozens of transactions,
orders, etc., etc. To read that assignment made one feel that error,
whole error, and nothing but error had been committed, so help you
the appellant. Moreover, each error appeared to be separate and distinct
from the others, an independent ground for relief unrelated to anything else in the case. I went to work on the mountain, wondering
how the trial court could have managed to pile up error so variously
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and universally. The law of averages gave every indication of having
been exploded. It turned out that all the errors came down to onedid the court have jurisdiction to do what it had done? It did.
That kind of brief I would label the "obfuscating" type and, if
you know judges, it is distinctly not the kind to use if you wish calm,
temperate, dispassionate reason to emanate from the cloister. If obfuscation was not intended, the only other explanation is that the attorney did not know the difference between a legal result and its consequences. Each of his "errors" was merely another, but well-disguised,
way to state a particular consequence of the view that the court was
wanting in jurisdiction.
I strongly advise against use of the obfuscating type of brief,
consciously or unconsciously. Though I have called this overanalysis,
it really is a type of underanalysis.
In the second place, a fairly commonly incurred danger is that of
concentrating so fully and completely on your own picture of the
facts and issues that you miss the big one or can't see the merit of the
other fellow's. Occasionally this is done by the lawyers on both sides.
The result is an argument in hiatus, and the gap may be the hole where
the big issue is hiding.
Perhaps I can illustrate the point with a recent case. A and B
were arrested for robbery. They were tried and convicted on evidence
which included confessions made out of court, identifications by the
victim, etc. But at the trial it was proved, over objection, that the
defendants had "pleaded guilty" at the preliminary hearing. Then
they had no counsel, nor were they warned they might have counsel or
that they. not speak or, if they should do so, their statements might
Later, at arraignment, the courts' assigned
be used against them.
counsel, not guilty was pleaded and full defense on the merits was
made. The appeal was taken in forma pauperis. The only question
on appeal was whether the plea of guilty made at the preliminary hearing was properly admitted in evidence at the trial.
The prosecution asserted that admissibility was controlled by the
law of voluntary or extrajudicial confessions. The defense claimed
violation of the right of counsel and of the privilege against selfincrimination. On the prosecution's theory, there was no compulsion
sufficient to destroy the probative value of the plea, regarded as a confession of guilt. On the theory of the defens<e, a serious question arose
whether the privilege had been violated. There was no controlling
authority. But analogies from Supreme Court decisions were close, on
both sides, and conflicting. The government relied heavily on cases
holding that statements not amounting to a confession or admission
of guilt, made under circumstances similar to those existing when the
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plea was made, were admissible. The defense relied on a decision excluding a plea of guilty made at arraignment. Our case stood exactly
between the two lines of Supreme Court decisions. Both analogies were
close. In the absence of the other, each probably would have ruled our
decision. But there they stood thumbing noses at each other-and
with our case in between.
The point in regard to the briefs is this: Each brief was admirable
-on its theory. Each cited pertinent authorities, perhaps all of them.
Each drew its analogies closely. Each was a lawyer's work of art. But
there was one respect in which each failed. Neither discussed on principle
why its basic theory of the case, rather than that of the other, should
apply. What I wanted to know, and for me it was the controlling issue,
was why the rule of evidence rather than the privilege, or vice Uersa,
should be applied in and should control this case. But the arguments
largely skipped this question, namely, what considerations dictate that
this body of law rather than that one be applied. And because the
authorities most controlling were so approximate the pending case on
both sides, and so directly contradictory in analogy as to the outcome,
this was almost wholly a question of principle, perhaps somewhat of
history, as distinguished from one of authority merely.
So much for analysis. though possibly one thing more should be
added. If your case should present several issues regarded as important,
it aids when you indicate which you think are the more important.
Again, this is a matter of emphasis for the brief.
The Argument
I turn now to the third function, the application of the law-in
other words, your argument proper. Given the facts, given right and
true analysis, two functions remain, argument on principle and argument on authority.
Having been so long a teacher, I suppose I have a predilection for
principle, though that does not imply a contempt for authority.
But I find enlightenment in the former respect absent more frequently than in the latter. Perhaps my major criticism of briefs, apart
from that relating to analysis, would deal with the lack of discussion
on principle. Some cases are so clearly ruled by authority, directly in
point and controlling, that discussion of principle is superfluous. But
these are not many. I have been surprised to find how many appealed
cases present issues not directly or exactly ruled by precedent. That is
as it should be. The novel case is the one most appropriate for appeal,
and the bar, on the whole, appears to exercise excellent discrimination
in selecting such cases for appeal. I.n a large percentage of the cases,
therefore, there is room for discussion and thought as well as for ci-
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Discussion on principle has direct relation to analysis of facts.
If that is clearly and fully made, the former will follow almost automatically. What we want to know is why this case, or line of cases,
should apply to these facts rather than that other line on which your
opponent relies with equal certitude, if not certainly. Too often the
why is left out. The discussion stops with the assertion that this case
or line of cases rules the present one. Assertion is not demonstration.
And beyond the amount necessary for statement of position and emphasis it may weaken or indicate that you are doubtful of your position.
"The lady doth protest too much." The argument which stops at
this point gives us the lead you wish us to follow. But it is bobtailed,
nevertheless. The lead may be the wrong one, or we may think it such.
Your reasons for thinking it the right one may keep us out of error, if
percliance we can be saved. In a close case, where the authorities pertinent
by. analogy are conflicting and especially when they are equally pertinent
and numerous on both sides, the discussion of the underlying principles
as related to the present application counts heavily to swing the scales.
In this connection, I shall have a suggestion to make later, concerning
the use of legal periodicals.
Finally, I come to the authoritative function. I shall state this
as briefly as possible.
1. When available the cases in point-on all fours-are the ones
we want. If they are available, your way, and in quantity to settle the
law,5 citation and discussion of others wastes your time and ours.
There is one ekception. That is when the law is settled the wrong
way and you think you can play legal Don Quixote successfully. This
has become a legal sport more popular in recent than in former years.
But it is still a mountain-climbing sport and when one tries to climb
perhaps anything goes, principle, law review articles, Brandeis briefs,
whatnot. The climb is not recommended for everyday exercise.
2. When the case is not ruled by precedent, then precedent by
analogy must take over the functions of persuasion and decision. And
this is where much waste occurs. The cases most approximate are the
ones we need. But approximation is always a matter of judgment and
degree. It is the old question of "when is far too far?" When using
cases by analogy (as well as otherwise) and relying heavily upon them,
it is always wise to give, in your own words, a brief and accurate statement of the facts. Half or more of the meaning of the case you discuss
is lost, unless you do this-or unless your opponent has done it sufficiently for you.
lation.

"There is not time for digression to discuss pet theories of stare decis.'s. But one
decision doesn't always give set to the law. Perhaps it seldom does. It was nearly fifty
years before the law as to the scope of interstate commerce -and Congress' power over
it assumed sufficient stability to be reliable as precedent in matters of federal power to
regulate business activities, particularly in manufacturing.
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For instance, if your case is a civil one, involving a question of
paternity, and an issue is the use and admissibility of blood tests, citation
of criminal cases excluding such tests without showing that they are
criminal cases will not aid you. We will find it out. And when we do
your argument may be weakened more by the discovery than if you had
made it for us in the first place. We become, I think quite naturally,
more critical of all the authorities you cite. Blood tests may be one
thing in a bastardy proceeding, another in a civil suit for damages for
drunken driving, and still another for criminal prosecution for the latter.
It makes the brief clear to know which is involved when it discusses
some case in order to rely upon it.
3.
Referring again to what I have said about discussing principle, and recalling also the shots I have taken at law teachers and law
reviews, I suggest now quite seriously the more frequent and general
citation of law review materials. By this I mean the notes and comments as well as the leading articles. I am not unconscious of the rumor
which I heard shortly after coming on the court that the Court of Appeals had six copies of the Harvard Law Review and one copy of the
Code of the District of Columbia. The slander is false. We have two
copies of the Code.
But back from the Code to the law reviews. When material pertinent to your problem can be found, and it will seldom be lacking now,
the legal periodicals have several distinct advantages, and I mean for
citation in the brief for the purpose of winning on appeal.
First, if a leading article or a good note or comment is in point
on your case, or on an issue it presents, it will cite more pertinent cases
than the average busy lawyer is likely to find through the digest or
Corpus Juris. Its strictly authoritative value is first-rate. But this presupposes you cite periodical material with the same discrimination you
do cases; in other words, it is the articles in print, or closely so, which
are helpful. For your assistance in locating them, the Index to Legal
Periodicals is available.
Again, an article or comment in point does something more than
any single case can do. A case is an incident in the history of a principle
or principles. It indicates, but it does not define or comprehend a trend.
It is merely a link in a chain. A good article gives one, in addition to
good citations, the history of an idea, the background of an institution,
the evolution of a principle, and lines of discrimination for its application. In a recent case in which case authority was scarce, and involving difficult questions of administrative law and procedure, I found
more help in about three law review articles than in all the case law
and the statutes. They gave me the legislative history of the agency
and the administrative history of its functioning. These I could not
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have secured from the strictly authoritative materials. Nor could I
have secured them otherwise than as I did without weeks of investigation which I did not have to give to it and perhaps would not have
felt free to make had time been available.
Finally, though other advantages might be mentioned, law review materials, especially leading articles and notes, give superior analysis
of problems and discussions of their legal disposition on principle. The
"1'professor" still gets the raspberry. Too often still it is more rasp than
berry. The "college boy" editor or author still supplies sport for the
practical man of the law. But the professor is by way of becoming respectable in law, somewhat as his European colleagues were before
academic freedom, and with it the great influence of the universities,
disappeared from the continent. And, regardless of whose "hot dogs"
they may be, the college-boy lawyers are showing, and show us every
day' briefs and oral arguments as able as any we read and hear. Prejudiced as I may be in their favor, I commend their product for your
favorable consideration and use. It will help you win cases if you learn,
first to respect and then how to 'use it.
Miscellaneous Suggestions
I have a few "do's" and a few "don'ts" further to mention in closing which may assist you to see something of the judge's point of view.
1. Be brief, that is, concise-but not too brief. By this I mean be
as brief as you can consistently with adequate and clear presentation of
your cause.
2.
Be candid. That applies to both facts and law. Nothing,
perhaps, so detracts-from the force and persuasiveness of an argument
as for the lawyer to claim more than he is reasonably entitled to claim.
Do not "stretch" cases you cite and rely upon too far, making them
appear to cover something to your benefit they do not cover. Do not
try to dodge or minimize unduly the facts which are against you. If
you can't win without doing this-and it is seldom you can by doing
it-your case should not be appealed. It is equally bad to give evasive
answers to questions at oral argument. Conversely, few things add
strength to an argument as does candid and full admission, whether as
to facts or law, of the factors which are clearly against one. When this
is made, we know that the lawyer is worthy of full confidence, and
every sentence he utters or writes carries force from the very fact that
he makes it.

3.

It helps to break the monotony of the printed legal page to

add a bit of life to it now and then. I do not refer merely to the facts of
life like those in Spencer v. United States. Recently a brief characterized

an opponent's argument as "splitting a legal hair the wrong way." That
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gave me a kick for a day. Now and then there is a bit of unconscious
humor. Recently this appeared, quite seriously, in a patent brief:
"All the prior inventors who worked on [this problem]
missed this important solution discovered by appellant. If one
or two or a few inventors had missed the solution, that would
not be convincing, but when hundreds of inventors missed the
solution and when, in fact, all the inventors prior to appellant
missed the solution, it would certainly seem unfair and unjust to
penalize appellant for discovering the solution by denying him a
patent."
In the same brief the absence of a fan (used in the prior art.) from
appellant's mechanism was emphasized by the Patent Office. To this his
lawyer replied:
"No patent is ever granted for not doing something. A man
to secure a patent must set out how the result he is attempting to get
is secured. He is not supposed to set out how it is not secured. As
to telling the public how they cannot secure the result of the inventor, [that] does not benefit the public. The law contemplates
that the public * * * shall know what shotild be done to secure the
beneficial result of the applicant's invention and not to know what
they should not do to secure it. This is plain common sense and, it
is thought, requires no citation." (Italics supplied.)
That one helped for a week. I do not recommend that you supply this brand of "life" in the brief, but it will be accepted with thanks
if the other cannot be supplied.
Now for a few "don'ts," some already touched upon.
First, as to quotations from prior opinions. I almost said, "don't."
But that would be going too far. Generally, omit the long ones. We,
too, can read the opinions, particularly if they are cited. And, again
generally speaking, leave out the abstract ones. By that I mean quotations from opinions usually are meaningless, or nearly so, unless accompanied by thumbnail sketches of the important facts of the case.
Meaning then becomes concrete and definite. "Thumbnailing" is an art.
Again, avoid overstatement and repetition, except for the proper
uses of emphasis. Frequently we are able to understand the statement
after the third reiteration, that is, if it is understandable.
Finally, avoid as much as possible stilted legal language, the "thereins," "thereofs," "whereinbefores," "hereinafters," and what-haveyou's. Use English wherever you can express the idea as well and as
concisely as in law. A healthy respect for the robust Ango-Saxon appeals to me more than does the Latin, whether or not it is Anglicized.
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The home-grown product in this case is better than the imported one.
But law has its vocabulary and that has its proper uses. Technical legal
terms and phrases often shorthand ideas otherwise to be stated only
with circumlocution and loss of meaning. Then one should "talk like
a lawyer." But the abuse comes when good, simple English will do
the work of the term of art just as well. The readability- of Holmes
and Cardozo is due, in part, to their mastery of the native tongue and
subjugation of the acquired language of the law.
In closing, I should say that the real way to talk profitably about
briefs would be to exemplify them. The brief, and its merit, are always
relative to the particular case. Cases, and therefore briefs, are as varied
as the subject matter and the lawyers who try cases and write the briefs.
But exemplification being not practical under the circumstances, I have
given you general observations, each of which should be qualified in
relation to particular applications as your sound judgment dictates.
After all, you write the briefs. On the whole, you do an excellent job.
It is the rare brief that leaves us uninformed, confused (more than before we read it), or irritated. Happily, the general effect is one which
makes us proud to be members of the profession, though now somewhat apart from its most active life. Through you as lenses we see the
causes of your clients. If we fail to see them truly, more often than not
it is our vision, not the lens, which is defective. But in unison, vision
and lens reflect the picture of the life they serve and, may we hope, guard
to some extent from the dangers which sweep over and throughout a
storm-tossed world. That the service may be done in justice requires
that it be done, by each of us, in humility. Without that, no man can
rightly be judge, or counsel, in another's cause. For you, too, are
judges of the people, without whom few causes would come to us for
decision in such form that their rights and liberties would be vindicated
and protected.

The New District Court Rules Now Available
The new rules for the Denver District Court which were adopted
by the judges of the court on February 7, 1942, have been printed, and
an ample supply of the rules are now on hand. The clerk, Major J.B.Goodman, Jr., states that attorneys may procure as many copies as are
desired by calling for them at his office.

Scope of the Right of Way Privilege
By

LELAND

E.

MODESITT*

In traffic cases the import of the right of way is commonly misconceived. Frequently the law by which such a right is conferred is
misconstrued, particularly by the lower courts. The courts so consistently decline to define the phrase "right of way" that one readily
infers it to be a matter of common knowledge. Various definitions of
the right of way privilege have been drafted:
"Right of way is the privilege of immediate use of the street
or highway."'
"Right of way merely means a preference to one of two vehicles asserting right of passage at the same place and at approximately the same time.' '2
"Right of way means the right of a vehicle to proceed uninterruptedly in a lawful manner in the direction in which it is
moving in preference to another vehicle approaching from a different direction into its path." 3
These definitions serve to describe generally a relative right which
is inherently a nebulous conception and which becomes a concrete right
only in the light of the circumstances of each case.
The regulation with which we are chiefly concerned is that which
provides that every driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall
yield the right of way to the driver of the vehicle approaching from the
right. This is the Denver ordinance 4 and the usual rule adopted in
municipalities. The Colorado statute-" and the ordinances of some of
the smaller communities vary materially from this in their practical
application.
*Of the Denver bar.
'Denver Municipal Traffic Code. §1; Ordinance No. 16, Series of 1932, §1;
COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935 c. 16, §76 (dd).

In the statutory definition the word

"street"2 is omitted.
Cow'an v. Market Street Ry. Co., 8 Cal. App. (2d) 642, 646, 47 P. (2d) 752,
754 (1935).
'Kling v. George Ast Candy Co., 33 Ohio App. 177, 179, 168 N. E. 761 (1929).
'Supra note 1, §65 (a).
5
COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935) t. 16, §208.
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That the driver on the left is at a disadvantage from the beginning,
is a certainty, but the cases and decisions indicate clearly that the driver
on the right is amenable to all of the laws created for public safety. The
driver on the right has no license to proceed with reckless abandon; sometimes he has no right to proceed at all. His privilege is conditional
upon his ability to exercise it with reason and discretion.
In Ward v. Clark,' Mr. Justice Cardozo stated:
"The plaintiff [the driver on the left] in shaping his own
course might act upon the assumption that common skill and
prudence would shape the defendant's also. He was not required
to foresee the defendant's blind and uncompromising adherence to
an undeviating line. The supreme rule of the road is the rule of
mutual forbearance."
The Colorado decisions on the right of way question are not
numerous, but are adequate to furnish an understandable perspective.
In Golden Eagle Dry Goods Company v. Mockbee7 the court
stated that it was the duty of every driver on approaching a street intersection to see whether there was liklihood of a collision with another
car approaching from the right, and if there was, to yield the right of
way and to keep his car under such control that he could do so. The
plaintiff was driving an automobile southward on South University
Boulevard in Denver. As she was crossing the intersection at East
Evans Avenue s a motor delivery car of the defendant, driven eastward
by defendant's servant, collided with plaintiff's car and injured her. The
plaintiff recovered damages in the lower court, but the decision was
reversed because of an erroneous instruction. This was one of the first
cases involving the Denver right of way ordinance, and the instruction
complained of was based upon language in the ordinance similar to
that of the present Colorado statute which confers a privilege upon the
automobile first reaching the intersection. The instruction was considered erroneous, because in effect it would repeal the Denver ordinance
and because it was impracticable. It was stated, however, that the lower
court was clearly right in warning the jury that one having the right of
way is not absolved from the duty of exercising reasonable care and
may not approach the intersection at a negligent rate.
6232 N.Y. 195, 198, 133 N. E. 443 (1921).
'68 Colo. 312, 189 Pac. 850 (1920).

8
At the date of this case both Evans Avenue and University Boulevard were designated as "streets" and neither was a stop or through street.
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In Rosenbaum v. Riggs' the plaintiff, who was the driver on the
left, was denied recovery because his own admissions established his
contributory negligence. He testified that he was going from eight to
ten miles an hour and could have stopped within five or six feet had he
desired. However, he saw no reason why he should give the right of
way to the defendant, who was some one hundred feet away when
plaintiff proceeded into the intersection. The rule handed down placed
a duty upon the driver to look to the right when nearing a crossing.
and if he sees, or could have seen an approaching car in time to stop and
neglects to do so, he is guilty of contributory negligence. The court
stated that the plaintiff should have assumed that the defendant, having
the right of way, would probably continue at a high rate of speed, and
therefore was negligent in not stopping when he could easily have
done so.
In St. Mary's Academy v. Newhagen' ° the court considered the
plaintiff negligent as a matter of law in not looking to the right immediately before she proceeded into the intersection. She had seen the
defendant's car on the right some 300 feet from the intersection, when
her own car was about 80 feet therefrom. Fearing danger from the
left because of a building which intercepted her view from that direction, she did not look again to the right, because, she said, she did
not have time, but continued to look to the left until the car she was
driving was struck by defendant's car. The negligence of the driver of
the car on the right was conclusively established, but the plaintiff was
denied recovery because of her own carelessness in not looking again to
the right to ascertain defendant's position at the moment she entered
the intersection. Whether the defendant had abused the privilege, or had
lost his right of way because of reckless driving was not considered.
In each of the Colorado cases previously considered the defendant
won a judgment by virtue of the right of way ordinance, and the
right of way as a defense in a negligence action was almost unquestioned
until Boyd v. Close" was decided. In this case the cars did not meet
while crossing an intersection at right angles; they were proceeding in
opposite directions along the same street, and the accident occurred when
the plaintiff turned to the left in front of the defendant's oncoming
"75 Colo. 408, 222 Pac. 134 (1924).
"77 Colo. 471, 238 Pac. 21 (1925).
'82 Colo. 150. 257 Pac. 1079 (1927).
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car. The defendant contended that he had the right of way because the
plaintiff became the driver on the left in making the left turn. Corroborated testimony showed the defendant's car was in fact approaching at
45 miles an hour, its driver was drunk and reckless, he did not signal,
slow down, turn or use his brakes. He covered the intervening 300 feet
while the plaintiff was going 90 feet. The court held for the plaintiff.
stating that it could not fix responsibility in every case of automobile
crossing collisions in favor of the car having the right of way under
the strict provisions of the ordinance or statute notwithstanding drunkenness, gross negligence, excessive speed and every reasonable caution
exercised by the other.
Golden Eagle Dry Goods Company v. Mockbee, 1 2 Rosenbaum v.
Riggs, 3 and St. Mary's Academy v. Newhagen,14 which were cited by
defendant, were held not to sustain his contention. The court stated
that Rosenbaum v. Riggs was not applicable because the plaintiff there
knew that defendant was approaching at an excessive speed, knew that
a collision was imminent, could have avoided it but did not even make
the attempt, and that the same facts existed in St. Mary's Academy case.
The court stated in Boyd v. Close, that to deny the plaintiff recovery
under the circumstances there set forth would be in effect to outlaw every
driver on the left and give carte blanche to every driver on the right to
run him down. It considered the mere statement of such a proposition
its own refutation.
Failure to observe what a reasonably prudent person in her position could have observed was considered contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff in Kracaw v. Micheletti. 5 The undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiff was traveling at a moderate speed and
when she reached a point about 15 feet from the intersection she saw
defendant's car approaching about 200 feet distant. She continued to
watch defendant's car, but could not ascertain its speed. She thought
she had time to cross ahead of it, but as a consequence of making an
attempt a collision ensued. The accident occurred in broad daylight.
The court held that plaintiff negligently proceeded to take the right of
way, and upheld a directed verdict for the defendant, even though the
"2Supra note 7.
"Supra note 9.
"Supra note 10.
"'85Colo. 384, 276 Pac. 333 (1929).
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latter's excessive and negligent speed was clearly established by the
evidence.
The case was distinguished from Boyd v. Close16 on the basis of
a materially different fact situation. In Boyd v. Close the accident occured at night, during a snow storm, and the cars were approaching
head on. Under these circumstances the court-felt that the plaintiff
could not properly be charged with notice of defendant's excessive speed,
and not having actual notice to the contrary, could assume that the defendant was driving in a lawful manner. In other words, he drove
according to the hypothetical standard of a reasonably prudent person
under the same circumstances and could not be charged with negligently
taking the right of way. In Kracaw u. Micheletti the plaintiff could
have ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence that the defendant's car was approaching at a high rate of speed, and her failure to yield
the right of way under these circumstances was considered manifest
negligence. She had no right to proceed across the intersection on the
assumption that the defendant was driving in a careful and prudent
manner when she should have had positive notice to the contrary.
In Campion v. Eakle,17 the court set forth the rule that although
one driving an automobile may have the right of way, he is not absolved
from the duty of exercising reasonable care. However, this was a guest
case and the negligence of the driver to the left in not yielding the right
of way was not directly in issue.
In Hicks v. Cramer,", an instruction to the effect that even if the
plaintiff had the right of way, if he failed to exercise due care, and
such failure was a contributing cause of the accident, he could not recover, was held to be the applicable law.
The interpretation of the right of way rule was a cardinal point in
Stocher v. Newcomb."9 The plaintiffs' car was proceeding across the
intersection at less than twelve miles per hour when it was struck by
defendant's automobile approaching from the right. Plaintiff did not
even see defendant's car whe,n she started to cross the intersection, but
saw it. coming very fast when it was almost upon her. Defendant's
0

' Supra note 11.
1779 Colo. 320, 246 Pac. 280 (1926).
885 Colo. 409, 277 Pac. 499 (1929).

"p91 Colo. 479, 15 P. (2d)

975 (1932).
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estimated speed was about 50 miles per hour. However, defendant contended that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in taking the right
of way. The court felt otherwise, stating:
"The rule that an automobile driver on the left should yield
the right of way to one on the right does not carry with it a
license for excessive speed or reckless driving on the part of anyone. Drivers on the right are as amenable to the law as those on
the left; the rule is one of safety and to facilitate traffic; it is
promulgated for the use of the traveling public and not for abuse.
The rule does not deprive others of their right to the use of the
public highways. In Boyd v. Close . . . we repudiated the notion

that there is such a thing as an unlawful right of way, and we
have not changed our minds." 20
A recent case of considerable significance to the profession and of
great moment to the press was Buerger Brothers Supply Company v.
Denver Fire Reporter and Protective Company.2 t There the plaintiff had
the right of way and was traveling 8 to 10 miles per hour as he proceeded into the intersection. He kept looking to the right because there
was a building on the corner which obstructed his vision. His vision to
the left was clear but he did not look to the left until he entered the
intersection. When he did so, he saw the defendant's car entering the
intersection. He stepped on the accelerator in an attempt to avoid a
collision but his increased speed was insufficient to cause his car to clear
and it was struck in the left rear portion.
The defendant in support of its motion for a nonsuit urged that
plaintiff's driver was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law in not looking to the left before he entered the intersection, and the
lower court must have reached that conclusion, although it made no
specific finding to that effect. The Supreme Court reversed the holding
of the lower court granting the defendant's motion for nonsuit and
said:
"*

* * contributory negligence is not shown, because under the

ordinance the plaintiff had a right to be where he was, and at the
time owed no legal duty to yield the right of way to defendant ***
2

Supra note 19, at 485, 15 P. (2d)

'113 P. (2d) 671 (Colo. 1941).

at 977.
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We think that the plaintiff, under the doctrine announced in
Golden Eagle Co. v. Mockbee * * * and City and County of Denver

v. Henry * * * made out a prima facie ease and that the motion for
a nonsuit should have been overruled."

2

2

In citing Golden Eagle Dry Goods Company v. Mockbee 23 as authority for its decision the court indicates an affirmance of the principle
there laid down that the driver on the right is not absolved from the duty
of exercising due care. In other words, the question of reasonable care
on the part of the driver on the right should always be considered, but
at the same time it was error under the circumstances of the Buerger
Brothers case to find contributory negligence as a matter of law and to
direct a nonsuit based on that finding. It is true that the opinion contains language which might be construed as relieving the driver from
the duty of looking to the left, but it would seem that that language
should be construed in the light of the particular facts of the case.
"The language used in a court opinion must be interpreted in
the light of its use in the case under consideration, and confined to
the questions presented therein.-

24

One week after the Buerger Brothers case was decided the Supreme
Court handed down an opinion in Bauserman u. White. 2' The factual
situation there was that Mrs. White was riding as a guest in a car driven
by a Miss Berger, which was proceeding in a westerly direction on Glenarm Place. As the car approached the intersection of 13th Street and
Glenarm Place, Miss Berger stopped at the cross walk before proceeding
into the intersection in order to yield the right of way to a southbound
automobile stopped on 13th Street to her right. The driver of this car
motioned for Miss Berger to proceed across the intersection.' She complied, and when almost across the southbound car tracks the defendant's
car, driven southerly on 13th Street at a speed of 25 to 35 miles per
hour, came arou.nd the left of the car that was stopped, and struck the
rear portion of Miss Berger's car. The case was decided on the basis of
section 65 (d) of the Denver Traffic Code, 26 which reads as follows:
'Supra note 21, at 672.
'Supra note 7.

"City and County of Denver v. Henry, 95 Colo. 582, 585, 38 P. (2d) 895,
896 (1934).
-'114 P. (2d) 557 (Colo. 1941).
'Supra note 1.
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"Any driver or operator, while driving without lights at
such times as lights are required under Section 52 of this ordinance,
or while driving to the left of the center of the street, and reckless
driving, shall have no right of way whatever."
The court held that a driver approaching an intersection from the
right loses the right of way if he either drives to the left of the center of
the street or drives recklessly. Defendant's speed and his passing another
car near the intersection were accepted as ample proof of recklessness.
This was the first case to establish the relative or conditional nature
of the right of way privilege. I.n Rosenbaum v. Riggs27 and St. Mary's
Academy v. Newhagen 28 the right of way was the basis of the defense
of contributory negligence, notwithstanding the unlawful manner in
which the defendant exercised the right. Bauserman v. White, at least in
actions covered by the Denver ordinance, eliminated that basis if the
privilege was recklessly exercised.
In any attempt to harmonize the Colorado decisions on the right
of way rule it is imperative that the conditions and circumstances of
each case be analyzed and compared. Boyd v. Close 29 can be reconciled
with Rosenbaum v. Riggs30 because of the different circumstances under
which-the collision occurred in each case. It is also important to note
whether the person upon whom the right of way privilege is conferred
is the plaintiff or defendant. In a case where the defendant has the right
of way, a verdict might be directed for the defendant absolving him
from liability to the plaintiff, but this would not necessarily mean that
the defendant could recover his own damage from the plaintiff. In other
words, both parties might be guilty of negligence precluding either from
recovering from the other.
In conclusion it seems that the right of way privilege should never
constitute a license to abuse the other laws enacted for public safety.
It should be a conditional privilege existing only when the one upon
whom it is conferred can exercise it reasonably and solicitously; not
blindly and heedlessly. Such a construction would effect a more equitable disposition of the many traffic cases involving the right of way
privilege.
'Supra note 9.
'Supra note 10.
'Supra note 1 1.
'"Supra note 9.
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The Fable of the Timorous Lawyer and the
Omnicompetent Secretary
By RICHARD C. HEATON*
Once upon a time there was a Timorous Lawyer who was Deathly
Afraid of Women. He was, of course, a Confirmed Bachelor and, by
reason thereof, was Envied by each of his Friends whose life was Dominated by a Dame. But even his Intimates didn't know the Facts.
The only Female in the world with whom our Hero had more
than a Nodding Acquaintance was his Secretary, who had Been With
Him for a Long Time.
His First Job after he graduated from Law School was an Employment as the Very Youngest, in Years and Experience, of the Apprentices
in a Large Law Factory. The Superintendent of the Plant had then
Thrust Upon Him the Very Youngest, in Years and Experience, of the
Stenographic Assistance in the Pool, to wit, Our Heroine.
In Due Course of Time the Timorous Lawyer overcame his Distress in the Presence of the Fair Stranger to the point where he could
dictate to her without stammering and Once, when he suspected her of
Giving Him the Eye, he went so far as to Consider * * * But he knew
better than to Encourage That Sort of Thing in the Office, and promptly
Dismissed the Notion.
Years Passed. The Timorous Lawyer became a Professional Figure
in his own Right and his Secretary, who had Stuck With Him, considered herself Largely Responsible for his rise to Fame and Fortune. She
Made it Plain to him from the moment he opened his own office that
she was capable of Taking Complete Charge. She Did, too.
She began by Relieving him of Annoying Little Details, progressed
through a period of Taking Over His Routine Work and at length
Reached the Point where, as she put it, "Mr. Timorous simply couldn't
get along without me."
Privately, Mr. Timorous doubted this and had come to Long
Desperately for an opportunity to Put the Matter to the Test. Whenever
he so much as suggested to his Secretary that she try a month's vacation,
however, she would respond with either a kittenish, "How could you get
along without your Office Manager?" or a tearful, "I suppose you don't
really need me any more." Whatever the response, Timorous knew be
was Licked, and always Let the Matter Drop.
And so there Came a Day when the Omnicompetent Secretary was
not only Manager of the Office but Manager of the Boss as well. She had
long since established her Authority over all the other Hired Hands by
the Simple Expedient of Advertising Herself -as the Boss's Alter Ego. She
*Of the Los Angeles bar.
BULLETIN.
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generally Got Her Way with either the junior lawyers or the younger
stenographers in the Office when she prefaced her remarks with, "You
know that Mr. Timorous wants * * *" or "Mr. Timorous suggests
that you * * *" et cetera. The Help surmised that less than One Per

Centum of her demands originated with Mr. Timorous, but no one quite
Dared to Call her Bluff.
She ruled her Domain with an Iron Hand. She strictly forbade
Personal Telephone Calls, both incoming and outgoing, even in matters
of Life or Death, and listened in on nearly all the conversations over the
office lines, just To Be Sure. She staggered the girls' Lunch Hours simply
because they enjoyed Eating Together, although some said she did it so
that they couldn't Get Together and Talk about Her. She would Go
Out to the Bank for a Minute-'"For Mr. Timorous'--and stay all
afternoon, returning just before Quitting Time to make a great Pretense
of Work and to Arrange Things so that half the Force would have to
Stay Late. She would Gossip with anyone she could Buttonhole- especially if he were Pressed for Time-and when the Boss Caught Them
At It, would Manage to Make it Appear entirely the fault of the Innocent Participant. She Prohibited the Locking of Desks, and Went
Through Them without Conscience or Remorse. She kept at a Minimum all Personal Contact between Mr. Timorous and the Employees
and became Greatly Disturbed if any of them had more than a fleeting
Private Conversation with the Chief. She Quibbled about every item on
the Expense Account until the Young Attorneys felt that they Simply
Couldn't Afford out-of-town assignments. She was a Stern Arbiter of
the Office Morals and was Quick to Detect Romance, Frivolity, Vice or
Sin on the part of any Member of the Staff, whether enjoyed within or
without the Premises under her Control.
Most of these things Escaped the Attention of Mr. Timorous but
she Made Her Presence Known to him in other ways. She kept the books
and, using alternately the powerful weapons of scorn and tears, disbursed
his funds as She Thought Best. She narrowed the circle of his Friends
by turning from the Door or Putting off on the Phone those of whom
she Did Not Approve. She 'took the liberty" of Correcting his English
in documents which said just what he wanted them to say. She even
chose his clothes; when he showed up in something she didn't like, she
would Eye him with Disapproval and sometimes go so far as to sniff at
him-"Hmf!"--like that. She made him Wear his Rubbers.
One Day it Dawned on the Timorous Lawyer that he couldn't
possibly be more Henpecked if the Omnicompetent Secretary were his
Wife.
So he married her.
MORAL: "The husband is the head of the family * * *"--California Civil Code, Section 156.
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Charter Member of State Bar Dies
Jesse G. Northcutt, one of the charter members of the Colorado Bar
Association, died after a short illness at Trinidad on April 10.
Born in Christian County, Illinois, on January 5, 1862, he spent
his boyhood in the middle west, attending college at Eureka, Illinois.
After his graduation, he taught school for a short time, and then migrated to Dodge City, Kansas, where he was admitted to the bar. In
1889 he moved to Trinidad, where he became active in the Republican
party. He was elected judge of the district court for the third judical
district and served on the bench from 1894 to 1905.
During the World War, he organized the Second Colorado Infantry
Regiment and served as its colonel. At the conclusion of the war, he
entered the practice of law in Denver and maintained an office there
until he retired about ten years ago. He was a Mason, Knight Templar,
and a member of El Jebel Shrine. He is survived by four sons, three
daughters, a brother and a sister.
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